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Introduction and summary
From late 1997 through the third quarter of 2001, con-
tinuing fiscal surpluses by the federal government
caused the outstanding stock of Treasury debt to de-
crease substantially. While the onset of the current re-
cession, along with the recent tax cuts, has slowed or
even reversed this trend, many analysts believe that
the declines in Treasury debt will resume over the next
decade once the economy starts to strengthen. This
could present an operational problem for the Federal
Reserve. The Fed currently injects liquidity into the
economy by expanding bank reserves via open mar-
ket operations. That is, the Federal Reserve expands
liquidity by purchasing securities on the open market
and withdraws liquidity through open market sales of
securities. Currently, all permanent transactions by the
Federal Reserve open market desk use Treasury secu-
rities, and Treasury securities remain the primary me-
dium for temporary transactions. As demand for currency
and dollar-denominated bank reserves grows in the
years to come, the Federal Reserve will have to acquire
ever-increasing amounts of Treasuries via open market
purchases. But if the total stock of such securities shrinks
over the next decade or two, the Fed may find it in-
creasingly difficult to conduct the needed transactions.
The Federal Reserve would then have to consider
changing its longstanding procedures for open market
operations. In particular, the Fed may have to consid-
er purchasing securities issued by non-governmental
obligors.1 Is there a precedent for Federal Reserve
trading in privately issued assets? How does the Fed-
eral Reserve choose the medium to use for open mar-
ket operations? Has the Fed consistently chosen the
safest or most liquid class of securities, or has it sought
to influence the development of financial markets in
its choice of open market instruments?
In this article, I review the early history of open
market operations, with an eye toward addressing
these questions. The historical record shows that prior
to the U.S.’s entry into World War I, the Federal Re-
serve’s preferred media for open market operations
were private bills of exchange, trade acceptances, and
bankers’ acceptances,2 rather than public debt. The
Federal Reserve’s choice was influenced by the pre-
vailing theory of monetary policy, known as the real
bills doctrine, which held that the central bank should
only provide liquidity in exchange for securities that
directly finance commerce.
In addition, the Federal Reserve’s use of private
acceptances in open market operations was in part an
effort to encourage the development of an active sec-
ondary market in private paper. At the same time, the
Federal Reserve was rather reluctant to hold large quan-
tities of Treasury securities. Purchases of government
debt by the central bank were seen as tantamount to
“lending to the crown,” which was regarded as a dan-
gerous path for central bank policy. Furthermore, there
were problems of coordination with the Treasury that
took several years to resolve.
The Federal Reserve eventually moved away from
private paper toward Treasury securities for several
reasons. The supply of Treasuries expanded rapidly
during World War I due to the financing needs of the
war. Concomitantly, the secondary market in Treasuries
grew rapidly. The supply of private paper contracted
during the recessions of 1920–21 and (more important-
ly) 1929–33. Finally, events during the 1920s caused
monetary theorists to become disenchanted with the
real bills doctrine.46 1Q/2002, Economic Perspectives
So, what do we learn from this review of history?
First, there were extended periods when the Federal
Reserve conducted open market operations primarily
in private securities. Furthermore, the Federal Reserve
used its choice of open market instruments to influ-
ence the growth of financial markets in ways it deemed
useful for the public interest. Finally, a shift to a new
set of open market instruments may have unforeseen
side effects. It takes time to understand the full impli-
cations of a major change in operating procedures, so
a gradual transition may be the best way to proceed.
In the next section, I discuss the issues confront-
ing Federal Reserve open market operations as the
stock of Treasury debt shrinks. I then describe how
open market operations evolved from the earliest days
of the Federal Reserve through the Great Depression.
Finally, I discuss how this historical record might have
relevance to the issues of the present day.
The problems currently facing
open market operations
An important source of liquidity in the U.S. econ-
omy is the monetary base, M0, which consists of cur-
rency in circulation plus bank reserves. M0 comprises
about 97 percent of Federal Reserve liabilities. These
liabilities are balanced primarily by securities purchased
on the open market (approximately 96 percent of
Federal Reserve assets). The other main way that the
Federal Reserve expands liquidity is by lending to com-
mercial banks at the discount window. However, dis-
count window loans represent a very small fraction
(currently 0.015 percent) of Federal Reserve asset
holdings. The vast majority of Federal Reserve secu-
rity holdings—currently 95 percent—consist of U.S.
Treasury securities. The Federal Reserve has conducted
open market operations primarily in Treasury securi-
ties since the mid-1930s, and Treasuries are the only
medium it has used for its outright transactions since
1981.3 Thus, to a close approximation, every dollar’s
worth of M0 in circulation is matched on the Fed’s
balance sheet by one dollar’s worth of U.S. Treasury
securities acquired through open market purchases.
This fundamental balancing relationship presents
a problem: Demand for M0 is growing rapidly, while
the stock of Treasury debt that the Federal Reserve uses
to balance M0 has been shrinking. The black line in
figure 1 plots M0 from 1986 through the present (in-
dicated by the vertical line). Over this period, the mone-
tary base grew at a geometric rate of around 6.8 percent
per year. This is mostly due to a growing demand for
currency. In 1975, currency accounted for about 77
percent of M0. Since February 2000, however, this
fraction has exceeded 90 percent. (The only exception
occurred during the two weeks following the Septem-
ber 11 attacks, when the fraction of M0 represented by
currency dropped to 86 percent. This was due to the
Federal Reserve’s temporary expansion of bank re-
serves in response to the attacks.)
The growth in M0 is due in part to the growth in
domestic economic activity. In addition, much of the
increased demand for currency is due to increased de-
mand for dollars abroad. Consider two examples:
Ecuador formally replaced the sucre with the dollar
as its official currency in 2000; and, while the peso con-
tinues to be the official currency in Argentina, around
60 percent of transactions in Argentina are actually
conducted with dollars. (See Velde and Veracierto,
2000.) These trends are likely to continue inducing
growth in demand for the U.S. monetary base. The
black dashed line in figure 1 plots a projected path
for M0 through 2011.4 The projection is a mechanical
extrapolation of past trends and is not intended as a
detailed forecast. Nevertheless, it is a plausible first
guess at how the monetary base might evolve over
time. Figure 1 shows the monetary base approximate-
ly doubling in the next ten years.
To accommodate this growing demand for M0, the
stock of assets owned by the Federal Reserve must
grow. If the Federal Reserve continues its current policy
of maintaining virtually all its asset holdings in the
form of Treasury securities, its ownership of Treasury
debt will have to expand rapidly. However, the total
quantity of Treasury securities may well fall during
the coming years. The green line in figure 1 plots the
stock of outstanding Treasury debt from 1986 to the
present. Note that the level of Treasury debt had fallen
from $3.8 trillion in November 1997 to $3.3 trillion
as of September 2001, a decrease of over 10 percent
in less than four years. In spite of the recession that
started in March 2001 and the 2001 tax cuts, the con-
traction in Treasury debt continued at least through the
third quarter of the year.
The green dashed line in figure 1 plots the path
of Treasury debt implied by the Congressional Budget
Office’s (CBO) most recently published forecasts of
federal surpluses through 2012, released in January
2002.5 These forecasts take the effects of the current
recession into consideration. The CBO predicts small
deficits through early 2004, followed by surpluses.
The problem facing the Federal Reserve can be
seen by comparing the two forecasts in figure 1. Taking
these forecasts at face value, the stock of base money
demanded by the economy would equal the stock
of Treasury debt in July 2012. This means that the47 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
FIGURE 1
Monetary base versus Treasury debt
Note: Dashed lines indicate projected paths.
Source: U.S. Treasury, Federal Reserve Board, and author’s calculations.
billions of dollars
Federal Reserve could not accommodate the growing
demand for M0 beyond that date without purchasing
securities other than Treasuries. In fact, the problem
will arrive much sooner. The Federal Reserve recog-
nizes that Treasury securities serve a unique role in
financial markets. Because they are free of default risk
and are highly liquid relative to other assets,6 Treasuries
are a preferred savings instrument for foreign inves-
tors and are extensively used for hedging and as bench-
marks for pricing other fixed-income securities. If the
Federal Reserve held a large fraction of outstanding
Treasury securities, it would impair the liquidity of
Treasury markets, which could adversely affect other
markets and even affect the pace of economic activi-
ty. As a result, the Federal Reserve limits its fraction
of ownership of any individual Treasury issue. The
current ownership caps range from 35 percent for
Treasury securities with less than a year to maturity
to 15 percent for issues ten years and longer. If the
Federal Reserve continues to abide by these caps, it
will exhaust its capacity to acquire additional Treasury




Clearly, the Federal Reserve may well have to
modify its current procedures for conducting open mar-
ket operations. The Fed could relax its self-imposed
caps on Treasury holdings, but this could
impair liquidity in the Treasury market
and, in any event, would only represent a
temporary stopgap. A longer-run solution
would be for the Federal Reserve to start
including in its portfolio assets other than
Treasuries. Under current law, the Federal
Reserve can purchase a range of assets, in-
cluding direct obligations of federal agen-
cies or debt fully guaranteed by federal
agencies, debt of foreign governments,
certain state and local obligations, and se-
lected other instruments. There has been
speculation in the press that the Federal
Reserve might seek legislation to expand
its authority to hold private assets.7
The extension of the Federal Reserve’s
portfolio to non-Treasury securities raises
a number of questions. Which assets should
the Federal Reserve hold? Should it let
private market participants align on a new
substitute for Treasury securities and then
simply adopt this asset class? Alternative-
ly, should the Federal Reserve actively
seek to influence the evolution of fixed-income mar-
kets as they adjust to an era of diminishing supply of
Treasury securities? In particular, should the Federal
Reserve attempt to steer the market toward the type
of Treasury substitute that it prefers?
The sorts of choices the Federal Reserve now fac-
es are not unprecedented. In the following sections,
I review the early history of open market operations.
This account shows that, in the early days of the Fed,
Treasury securities were not the preferred medium
for open market operations. Only gradually did Trea-
suries displace other assets. Furthermore, the Federal
Reserve’s original intentions for open market opera-
tions included a desire to affect the evolution of finan-
cial markets. In particular, it sought to encourage an
active secondary market in acceptances. Thus, there
are antecedents both for the Federal Reserve holding
privately issued securities and for the Federal Reserve
using its open market procedures to influence the de-
velopment of financial markets. Having said this, fi-
nancial markets have changed enormously since the
early years of the Federal Reserve System, so we
should use caution in drawing lessons from these
precedents for current problems.
The early years of open market operations
The current practice of conducting Federal Re-
serve System open market operations almost exclu-
sively with Treasury securities was not anticipated in
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the earliest years of the Fed. Table 1, taken from
Meulendyke (1998), shows that bankers’ acceptances
were the primary asset class for the Federal Reserve
portfolio until World War I, and acceptances had a
roughly equal presence with Treasury securities
through the 1920s. Treasury securities did not become
predominant until the Great Depression. These patterns
reflect changes both in the thinking of Federal Reserve
officials and in the economic environment in which
the Fed operated.
At the inception of the Federal Reserve in 1913,
it was presumed that Federal Reserve assets would
primarily consist of short-term privately issued paper,
such as bankers’ acceptances, trade acceptances, and
bills of exchange.8 A key reason for this focus was the
real bills doctrine, which was the most influential
theory of central banking at the beginning of the
twentieth century. The real bills doctrine maintains
that “a banking system that confines its lending to dis-
counting short-term self-liquidating commercial bills
of exchange arising from real transactions in goods
and services—the productive use as opposed to the
speculative use of credit—cannot over-issue.”9 That is,
the banking system would not create excessive (and
therefore inflationary) amounts of credit. A particular-
ly important exponent of this view was Paul Warburg,
TABLE 1
Federal Reserve holdings, 1915–50
Year-end Treasury securities Bankers’ acceptances
(dollars in millions) (percent of total) (dollars in millions) (percent of total)
1915 16.0 19.8 64.8 80.2
1916 55.0 31.2 121.2 68.8
1917 122.0 31.4 266.9 68.6
1918 238.0 45.5 285.3 54.5
1919 300.5 80.8 71.6 19.2
1920 287.4 60.6 187.2 39.4
1921 234.1 61.8 145.0 38.2
1922 433.4 61.5 271.0 38.5
1923 133.6 27.5 352.0 72.5
1924 540.2 58.3 386.9 41.7
1925 374.6 50.2 372.2 49.8
1926 314.8 45.2 381.0 54.8
1927 560.0 64.4 308.9 35.6
1928 197.2 31.1 437.5 68.9
1929 487.3 67.4 235.3 32.6
1930 686.1 70.4 288.8 29.6
1931 774.6 78.3 215.3 21.7
1932 1,851.1 99.8 3.6 0.2
1933 2,435.3 95.7 108.1 4.3
1934 2,430.3 100.0 0.1 0.0
1935 2,430.3 100.0 0.0 0.0
1936 2,430.2 100.0 0.0 0.0
1937 2,564.0 100.0 0.5 0.0
1938 2,564.0 100.0 0.5 0.0
1939 2,484.2 100.0 0.0 0.0
1940 2,184.1 100.0 0.0 0.0
1941 2,254.5 100.0 0.0 0.0
1942 6,188.7 100.0 0.0 0.0
1943 11,543.0 100.0 0.0 0.0
1944 18,846.1 100.0 0.0 0.0
1945 24,262.3 100.0 0.0 0.0
1946 23,349.7 100.0 0.0 0.0
1947 22,559.4 100.0 0.0 0.0
1948 23,332.8 100.0 0.0 0.0
1949 18,884.6 100.0 0.0 0.0
1950 20,724.5 100.0 0.0 0.0
Source: Meulendyke (1998, table 1, p. 22).49 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
a banker with Kuhn, Loeb & Co., whose pamphlet,
“A plan for a modified central bank” (published dur-
ing the Financial Panic of 1907), strongly influenced
the drafting of the Federal Reserve Act of 1913.
While the real bills doctrine does not distinguish
between bills acquired through rediscounting and bills
acquired through open market purchases, there was a
perception that open market transactions by the Fed-
eral Reserve in the commercial bills market would be
beneficial to the economy. In particular, Warburg and
others believed that active trading of real bills by the
Fed could help foster the development of a secondary
market in these securities. Unlike most Western
European countries, the U.S. did not have an active
market in acceptances prior to the passage of the Fed-
eral Reserve Act. Warburg and others saw the devel-
opment of a liquid acceptance market as essential for
a modern banking system to emerge in the U.S. In
Warburg’s words, “We should aim to transform our
commercial paper from a non-liquid asset into the
quickest [that is, most liquid] asset of our banks.”10
Prior to the establishment of the Federal Reserve, the
most liquid short-term assets traded were call loans
used to finance stock purchases on the New York Stock
Exchange. This form of investment was seen as spec-
ulative, rather than productive. It was hoped that the
development of a liquid market in real bills would fa-
cilitate the optimal allocation of credit across indus-
tries and geographical regions11 and divert credit
toward productive investment and away from more
speculative uses.12 This development would be fos-
tered by a central bank that actively purchased these
bills in the open market.13 Pursuant to this goal, the
System’s purchases of commercial bills (primarily
trade and bankers’ acceptances) in the open market
vastly exceeded its acquisition of these securities via
rediscounting. We can see this in table 2,
which is taken from Agger (1922, table 2,
p. 216).14
In contrast to the focus on real bills
(particularly bankers’ acceptances) as ap-
propriate assets for a central bank, there
was some concern about central bank pur-
chases of government securities. Direct
loans to the government were seen as dan-
gerous, tying the supply of credit to the
spending whims of the government. Open
market purchases of government securities
were seen as equivalent to this sort of di-
rect lending. Furthermore, monetizing
government debt was seen as inflationary.
Hawtrey (1933, p. 131) summarized these
ideas as follows:
“[T]he acquisition of Government securities by
the central bank is regarded as opening the door
to inflation. It is usual for the power of the central
bank to lend to the Government to be carefully
circumscribed, and the dividing line between lend-
ing direct and buying Government securities in
the market may be rather a fine one.”
Similarly, in his pamphlet, “Principles that must under-
lie monetary reform in the United States” (published
in November 1910), Warburg warns against the infla-
tionary danger of issuing notes backed by government
bonds (Warburg, 1930b, p. 176).
In addition, it was thought that a well-run central
bank should be free from political influence.15 Exten-
sive holdings of government debt might compromise
central bank independence.16 Finally, the real bills doc-
trine emphasized that central bank assets should be short
term. At the time the Federal Reserve was established,
there were no short-term Treasury bills, and there was
no active market in short-term Treasury securities.17
Thus, Federal Reserve assets prior to World War I
were primarily short-term commercial bills. Table 3,
taken from Reynolds (1922b, p. 77) shows that until
mid-1917, commercial bills purchased in the open mar-
ket accounted for a larger fraction of Federal Reserve
assets than government securities. From the beginning
of 1916 through the start of World War I, bills pur-
chased in the open market exceeded those acquired
through rediscounting.18
World War I and its aftermath
It was America’s entry into World War I in April
1917 that spurred the big shift away from this focus
on commercial bills. The war was largely funded by
government debt. The Federal Reserve was reluctant
to buy government debt directly from the Treasury,19
TABLE 2
Federal Reserve Bank discounts and purchases
of trade and bankers’ acceptances
(in thousands of dollars)
Purchases in
Discounts open market
Year Bankers’ Trade Bankers’ Trade
1915 1,959 64,814 31
1916 5,212 369,762 16,333
1917 37,771 1,046,765 30,948
1918 19,940 187,373 1,748,503 61,036
1919 71,643 138,420 2,788,619 36,558
1920 187,162 192,157 3,143,737 74,627
1921 (9 months) 49,810 101,129 996,851 6,687
Source: Agger (1922, table 2, p. 216).50 1Q/2002, Economic Perspectives
but, under government pressure, it took steps to accom-
modate the increased supply of Treasury securities. It
accepted Treasury securities from member banks for
rediscounting; it accepted bills backed by Treasuries
from member banks for rediscounting; and it offered
a lower rate on loans collateralized with Treasury se-
curities than with other forms of collateral.20
As a result of these steps, the Federal Reserve’s
portfolio became heavily based (directly or indirect-
ly) on Treasury debt. By May 1919, 95.2 percent of
Fed purchases of commercial bills (total of rediscounts
plus open market purchases) were backed by govern-
ment securities. Open market purchases of government
securities also increased dramatically. According to
West (1977), such purchases amounted to only $4.37
million in April 1917. By March 1918, purchases of
government securities amounted to $1,099 million
(55.1 percent of total investments).21
Once the war ended, purchases of government
securities suffered a decline relative to acceptances.
However, the war did result in permanent changes
in Federal Reserve operations. First, the war years
established a precedent for extensive Federal Reserve
holdings of government debt. However, there were
those who advocated withdrawing from the Treasury
market following the end of the war. For example,
Welton and Crennan (1922) attributed the inflation
during World War I to the backing of currency with
government securities, and argued that this practice
TABLE 3
Earning assets of the Federal Reserve System
1914–17 (in thousands of dollars)
Bills discounted Bills bought U.S. government Municipal
Date for members in open market securities warrants
1914
December 31 9,909 205 734
1915
January 29 13,955 2,015 11,165
April 30 22,774 13,812 6,813 18,656
July 30 29,102 11,625 7,923 16,107
October 29 30,448 13,619 10,505 25,014
1916
January 28 26,901 26,314 21,372 20,602
April 28 21,448 47,585 45,841 36,933
July 28 27,594 83,454 48,656 27,220
October 27 21,131 86,085 40,469 29,890
1917
January 26 15,711 97,697 55,769 12,249
April 27 35,043 71,400 117,818 14,999
July 27 138,459 195,097 76,953 1,469
October 26 397,094 177,590 110,042 233
Source: Reynolds (1922b, p. 77).
should stop. Second, the volume of Treasury securities
issued to finance the war created an active market in
government debt.22
A third development was a growing disenchant-
ment with the real bills doctrine. In particular, the re-
cession of 1920–21 was caused in part by excessive
inventory building. The inflation following the end
of the war motivated firms to hold speculative inven-
tories, hoping to sell at higher prices. These invento-
ries were financed, in part, by commercial bills,
which were suitable assets for rediscounting under
the real bills doctrine. The central bank credit thus
created further fueled the inflation. As a result, Fed-
eral Reserve officials (notably Benjamin Strong,
president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York)
argued that the real bills doctrine was neither neces-
sary nor sufficient to avoid inflationary credit expan-
sion or to ensure that credit would be used for
productive, rather than speculative activity.23, 24
These developments weakened the Federal Re-
serve’s original focus on real bills. Thereafter, purchases
of real bills (mostly bankers’ acceptances) and govern-
ment securities coexisted. The recession of 1920–21
severely contracted the supply of bankers’ acceptan-
ces and other real bills.25 The Fed responded by re-
plenishing its earning assets with government debt.26
However, it appears that real bills were used for sec-
ular growth of the Federal Reserve’s open market
portfolio, while government securities were used to51 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
manage aggregate credit provision in the
short term. In particular, figure 2 (taken
from chart 9.3 in West, 1977, p. 191)
shows that the variability of government
securities purchases from 1921–23 was
much greater than the variability of open
market purchases of real bills.27 This
pattern suggests that Treasury securities
served a role analogous to present-day
temporary transactions.
In the early 1920s, an argument
against extensive open market operations
in government securities came from the
Treasury itself. The Reserve Banks’ ini-
tial open market activity in government
debt was uncoordinated, causing random
fluctuation in the pricing of these securi-
ties. This presented a problem for the
Treasury, making it more difficult to fore-
cast auction prices.28 In part to address the
Treasury’s concerns, in May 1922 the
Conference of Presidents of the Federal
Reserve Banks established a committee
on centralized execution of purchases
and sales of government securities to coordinate all
Federal Reserve purchases of Treasury securities.29
In 1923, this committee was reconstituted under the
supervision of the Board of Governors as the Open
Market Investment Committee, the precursor of the
current Federal Open Market Committee. The Treasury’s
concerns appeared to restrain the growth in the use of
government debt for open market operations.
The Depression, 1929–33
The event that ultimately caused a permanent shift
away from bankers’ acceptances to government secu-
rities was the Great Depression. According to Anderson
(1965), there was a consensus that the Federal Reserve’s
response to the market crash in fall 1929 should include
aggressive open market purchases. Anderson wrote
that, “Acceptances and, if necessary, [italics added]
government securities should be purchased to avoid
any increase and possibly to bring some reduction in
member-bank indebtedness to the Reserve Banks.”30
Interestingly, this quote suggests that acceptances,
rather than government securities, were seen as the
primary vehicle for increasing bank liquidity.
After 1929, however, it is difficult to find any men-
tion of acceptances in discussions of open market op-
erations.31 It appears that the aggregate supply of
acceptances fell with the decline in economic activi-
ty, rendering extensive open market operations in
FIGURE 2
Open market paper and government
securities purchased, 1921–23
Source: West (1977, chart 9.3, p. 191).
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acceptances simply infeasible. Evidence on this point
is provided by Groseclose (1965, p. 132): “[D]uring
the boom just preceding the stock market crash of
1929 the volume of bankers’ acceptances rose to around
$1.5 billion, but thereafter declined to less than $150
million at the end of 1941. ...” As a result, “[a]fter 1937
the Federal Reserve practically ceased to buy or redis-
count such paper” until after World War II. At the same
time, the government started issuing short-term debt
on a regular basis. The first Treasury bill issue was in
December 1929,32 providing the Fed with an alterna-
tive to bankers’ acceptances as a short-term instrument
for open market operations.
A final impetus for extensive Federal Reserve
holdings of government debt was provided by the
Roosevelt administration’s national recovery actions
in 1933. As with the costs of World War I, the govern-
ment financed these actions with debt. The Treasury
needed to ensure that debt issues were successful, and
the Federal Reserve responded to the Treasury’s con-
cerns. According to Anderson (1965, p. 72), “There
was a consensus that with excess reserves still substan-
tial, it was not desirable to buy government securities
to increase bank reserves. ... There was apprehension
[however] that if the Treasury could not do its financ-
ing successfully in the market, it would be forced to
seek accommodation directly from the Reserve Banks.”
As a result, in spring 1933 the Board of Governors
thousands of dollars52 1Q/2002, Economic Perspectives
authorized the purchase of up to $1 billion of govern-
ment securities, if necessary, to ensure successful
financing by the Treasury.
What can we learn from the
historical record?
We must be cautious in drawing lessons from this
historical account of open market operations. For one
thing, the events described in the preceding sections
all occurred under the gold standard, a very different
monetary environment from the present. In addition,
current financial markets are far more highly devel-
oped than in the early years of the Fed. Nonetheless,
there are a number of parallels between the System’s
experiences in its early years of existence and the policy
choices that the System may face over the next few
years. During the first three decades of the last centu-
ry, the Fed went through the process of changing the
class of securities used in open market operations. The
problem encountered by the Federal Reserve during
the recession of 1920–21 and the Great Depression
resembles that currently facing the System: a dwin-
dling supply of the assets traditionally used for open
market operations. In the 1930s, the problem was a re-
duced supply of acceptances induced by the econom-
ic contraction, while currently it is the possibility of
a reduced supply of Treasuries. The adjustment in the
1930s to a Treasuries-only policy was not immediate.
It took many years for the System to reconcile the ad-
vantages of using Treasury securities with their asso-
ciated problems, most notably the problem of central
bank independence highlighted by Bagehot (1873)
some 70 years before. Ultimately, these issues were
not to be fully resolved until the Treasury–Federal
Reserve Accord of 1951, in which the Treasury agreed
that the Fed should be permitted to pursue an indepen-
dent monetary policy.
In its early years, the Fed used open market op-
erations to affect the development of private markets.
Specifically, the System deliberately used the pur-
chase of private bills in the open market to foster the
development of a liquid secondary market in accep-
tances. This action stands in contrast to the Federal
Reserve’s current policy of minimizing market dis-
tortions, wherever possible, in its open market activi-
ties. In the early days of the System, however, concerns
about creating distortions in financial markets were
outweighed by other public policy considerations. At
that time, financial markets and the banking system
were not well developed. The Federal Reserve’s ac-
tivities might therefore be seen as serving a public
policy purpose by addressing a market incompletion.
Today’s markets are so much more highly devel-
oped that it is difficult to make a case for this sort of
active interventionist policy. Nonetheless, the Federal
Reserve still faces a basic issue that was recognized
in its early years: Its role in financial markets may
have an influence on market outcomes. If the Fed
moves toward accepting privately issued securities in
its open market account, this policy shift may affect
the evolution of markets. For example, as the supply
of Treasury securities contracts, private markets will
align on some alternative benchmark security to re-
place the ever-scarcer Treasuries. The System’s choice
of private assets to use in its open market operations
may influence the class of securities that emerges as
the new benchmark.
In addition, if the Fed purchases private securities,
it might be seen as selectively approving those obligors
whose paper it purchases. When the Fed discontinued
all purchases of acceptances in 1984 (it discontinued
outright purchases of acceptances in 1977), this con-
cern was a major factor. In the words of President
Solomon of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York,
“There are some people ... who misinterpret the Fed-
eral Reserve eligibility as a good housekeeping seal.”33
While there are antecedents for open market opera-
tions in private securities, there clearly are fundamen-
tal problems that must be addressed should the Federal
Reserve consider using private securities in this way
in the future.53 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
1Broaddus and Goodfriend (2001) propose that the Treasury con-
tinue issuing bonds sufficient to meet the Federal Reserve’s needs,
purchasing private assets with the proceeds if necessary. This
would transfer the responsibility of holding private assets from
the Federal Reserve to the Treasury.
2A bill of exchange is a negotiable security issued by one party (the
“drawer”) and accepted by the other party (the “drawee”), instruct-
ing the drawee to pay a fixed sum of money, usually as part of a
commercial transaction. It differs from a promissory note only in
that it is initiated as an instruction from the creditor, rather than
as a promise from the debtor. A trade acceptance is essentially a
bill of exchange issued in the course of an export/import transac-
tion. It is an obligation of the buyer in the transaction. A bankers’
acceptance is a trade acceptance that has been guaranteed by the
buyer’s bank, at which point it becomes an obligation of the bank,
rather than of the buyer.
3Outright transactions are purchases or sales of securities that are
intended to be permanent. The Federal Reserve generally conducts
outright transactions only a few times each year. In contrast, tem-
porary transactions are purchases or sales that are expected to be
reversed in the near term. Temporary transactions are conducted
more frequently. For a discussion of the difference between out-
right (or permanent) and temporary open market transactions, see
Meulendyke (1998).
4This forecast uses a statistical model that fits a twelfth-order
autoregression in the change in the log of M0. I use weekly data
from January 1962 through November 2001.
5U.S. Congress, CBO (2002). Also see the CBO website,
www.cbo.gov.
6See the discussion in Reinhart and Sack (2000).
7Temple-Raston and Weisman (2001).
8See Reynolds (1922b), pp. 74–75.
9Bordo and Schwartz (2000).
10From “A plan for a modified central bank,” quoted in Warburg
(1930a), p. 23.
11See Warburg (1930a), p. 17, and Agger (1922), p. 209.
12See West (1977), p. 185.
13According to Reynolds (1922b), one of the key goals of the Fed-
eral Reserve System in its first two years was “to endeavor to regu-
late the interest rates and equalize the demand for money by the
purchase of bills and acceptances in the open market” (Reynolds,
1922b, pp. 74–75, italics added). Note that in this quote the term
“bills” clearly refers to bills of exchange, as Treasury bills were
not introduced until 1929.
14West (1977), pp. 185–186, also notes Benjamin Strong’s efforts
at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to create an open market
in commercial paper.
15See, for example, Bagehot (1873), chapter 4.
16Warburg, (1930b), p. 172.
17Warburg, (1930b), p. 169.
18In comparing tables 2 and 3, note that table 2 gives cumulative pur-
chases over the year, while table 3 gives point-in-time asset stocks.
19The Reserve Banks did agree to take a $50 million issue of 90-
day certificates of indebtedness. (See West, 1977, p. 187.)
20See Reynolds (1922a), p. 191, and West (1977), pp. 187–188.
21See West (1977), p. 188.
22See West (1977), p. 192.
23See the discussion in West (1977), pp. 195–201.
24While the System moved away from the real bills doctrine during
the early 1920s, the ideal of a self-regulating monetary policy has
received renewed attention in recent years. Most notably, Sargent
and Wallace (1982) formalize the notion of an “elastic currency”
(in the terminology of the Federal Reserve Act of 1913). They show
how a theoretical version of the real bills doctrine can allow both
the quantity of money and the price level to respond optimally to
fluctuations in real economic activity.
25“From an estimated maximum of around $1 billion in acceptances
outstanding at the height of their use [prior to the recession], the
volume dropped to around $400 million in 1923. Much of this drop,
of course, was due to the business recession” (Groseclose, 1965).
26See Anderson (1965).
27See the discussion in West (1977), p.191.
28See Anderson (1965), p. 144.
29See Anderson (1965), p. 51.
30Anderson (1965), p. 61.
31For example, Anderson’s (1965) extensive discussion of the de-
bates over Federal Reserve open market policy in the 1930s focuses
exclusively on government securities.
32Bannon (1953).
33Transcript of the FOMC meeting of March 26–27, 1984, avail-
able on the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
website at www.federalreserve.gov/fomc/transcripts/
transcripts_1984.htm.
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